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Compensating Victims of Terrorism or
Frustrating Cultural Diplomacy? The
Unintended Consequences of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act's Terrorism Provisions
Danica Curavict
The law of unintended consequences, often cited but rarely defined, is
that actions of people-and especially of government-always have effects
that are unanticipated or 'unintended.' Economists and other social scien-
tists have heeded its power for centuries; for just as long, politicians and
popular opinion have largely ignored it.1
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Introduction
In 2008 and 2009, the Metropolitan Museum of Art hosted Beyond
Babylon: Art, Trade, and Diplomacy in the Second Millennium B.C., an exhibi-
tion that brought together nearly 350 artifacts originating from the Ancient
t B.A., Tufts University, 2006; Candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School 2011;
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1. Rob Norton, Unintended Consequences, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EcO-
NOMICS (David R. Henderson, ed. 2008), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/
Enc/UnintendedConsequences.html.
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Near East.2 Celebrating the era's transformation of the visual arts through
cultural exchange, the show offered viewers the opportunity to view arti-
facts never before displayed in the United States.3 The exhibit traced the
historic developments-including improved diplomatic relations between
rulers-which led to the cross-cultural trade of resources, aesthetics, and
influence. 4 Initially, Syria committed to lending fifty-five objects to Beyond
Babylon.5 Just prior to the opening, however, Syria broke with the exhibi-
tion's theme of cultural exchange by declining to go through with their
planned contribution. 6
Traditionally, when an American museum receives a piece of art or an
artifact from a foreign state it will petition the State Department for a grant
of immunity, which protects the loaned object from being subject to attach-
ment while in the United States.7 Despite the Metropolitan's request, Syria
remained concerned that recently passed amendments to the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act (the FSIA) rendered any grant of immunity by the
State Department moot.8 Specifically, Syria feared that victims of terror-
ism who had recently obtained judgments in federal court would seek to
attach the objects on loan to satisfy the multi-million dollar awards they
had received. 9 Despite the Syrian government's desire to participate in the
exhibition, the fifty-five pieces belonging to Syria only appeared in the
show's catalog. 10 Syria's decision to refrain from participating in the exhi-
bition represented a disappointing breakdown in present-day diplomatic
relations.
In 1996, Congress amended the FSIA to allow a U.S. citizen to bring a
claim in federal district court for damages resulting from a state-sponsored
terrorist act if the United States has designated the foreign state a "state
2. See Metropolitan Museum of Art, Special Exhibitions, Beyond Babylon: Art,
Trade, and Diplomacy in the Second Millennium B.C., http://www.metmuseum.org/spe-
cial/sepastexhib.asp (select "All" for month and "2009" for year, follow "Go", then fol-
low "Beyond Babylon: Art, Trade, and Diplomacy in the Second Millennium B.C.")
[hereinafter Metropolitan Museum of Art].
3. See id; Holland Cotter, Art Review, Beyond Babylon: Global Exchange, Early Ver-
sion, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at C25.
4. See Metropolitan Museum of Art, supra note 2.
5. See Cotter, supra note 3.
6. See Cotter, supra note 3 ("The Met submitted applications for immunity from
seizure for all the borrowed foreign works . . . but finally decided that the amendment
jeopardized the Syrian loans, so decided not to go through with them.")
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 2459 (2006); see also Statement, Archaeological Institute of
America, On the Attachment of Cultural Objects to Compensate Victims of Terrorism
(Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://www.archaeological.org/pdfs/AIAAttachment.pdf
[hereinafter AIA Statement].
8. See AlA Statement, supra note 7 ("[I]n light of the 2008 amendments [to the
FSIA1, even a State Department grant of immunity might not protect the objects from
attachment by individuals who have claims against Syria for supporting terrorist
activity.").
9. See Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(awarding over $400 million in damages to surviving family members of victims of ter-
rorism); Cotter, supra note 3.
10. See Cotter, supra note 3.
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sponsor of terrorism."' 1 In the years following the passage of the amend-
ment, courts awarded victims of terrorism substantial monetary dam-
ages.12 Nevertheless, successful plaintiffs were unable to collect even a
fraction of their judgments. 13 In an effort to facilitate the ability of plain-
tiffs to recover their judgments, Congress in 2008 expanded the scope of
foreign-owned assets that are attachable under the provisions of the
FSIA. 14 Proponents of the amendments argue that the FSIA now provides
another means for the Obama administration to fight terrorism: using the
courts to penalize those states that sponsor terrorism.' 5 Such arguments,
however, fail to consider the cost of further alienating countries that are
already antagonistic toward the United States.
16
American political scientist Milton C. Cummings describes cultural
diplomacy as the process through which two countries exchange ideas, val-
ues, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspects of culture with the
shared goal of fostering understanding between their governments and citi-
zens.17 Traditional forums for such cultural exchange include the arts,
sports, literature, music, science, and industry.' 8 For example, countries
and private organizations engage in cultural diplomacy when they organize
cross-cultural museum exhibitions or sporting events. 19 In particular, the
experience of art can foster and promote understanding and cooperation
11. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 221(a), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)).
12. See Michael T. Kotlarczyk, Note, "The Provision of Material Support and
Resources" and Lawsuits Against State Sponsors of Terrorism, 96 GEO. LJ. 2029, 2044
(2008) (discussing the "substantial punitive damage awards" against Iran and Cuba
shortly after the 1996 amendments).
13. See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Note, Resolving Outstanding Judgments Under the
Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 496, 499
(2002); Alicia M. Hilton, Terror Victims at the Museum Gates: Testing the Commercial
Activity Exception Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 53 VILL. L. REv. 479, 480
(2008) (noting that "more than ten years after the attacks, the plaintiffs in [Rubin] have
yet to realize any meaningful recovery.").
14. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(g), National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 1083, 122 Stat. 338 [hereinafter NDAA].
15. See Steven R. Perles & Maj. Gabriel Lajeunesse, Policy Options for the Obama
Administration: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as a Tool Against State Sponsors of
Terrorism, 22nd Gustov Sokol Program on Private International Law : Human Rights
Litigation on US Courts; University of Virginia Law School (2009), available at http://
works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013 &context=gabriel-lajeunesse.
16. See Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 13.
17. See Milton C. Cummings, Jr., Washington, D.C: Center for Arts and Culture, Cul-
tural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey 1 )(2003), available at http://
www.culturalpolicy.org/pdf/MCCpaper.pdf.
18. See Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, What is Cultural Diplomacy? http://www.
culturaldiplomacy.org/index.php?en culturaldiplomacy.
19. See e.g., Cummings, supra note 17, at 6 (discussing the first cultural art exhibit
exchange); David A. DeVoss, Ping-Pong Diplomacy, SMITHSONtAN, Apr. 2002, available at
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/pingpong.html (chronicling
President Nixon's ability to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough with the People's Repub-
lic of China through a series of table tennis matches between American and Chinese
athletes and quoting Chinese Premier Chou En-lai as stating that "[nlever before in his-
tory has a sport been used so effectively as a tool of international diplomacy.").
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among the diverse people and cultures of the globe. 20 Even the U.S. gov-
ernment believes "that citizens of other countries benefit from exposure to
American works of art just as Americans benefit from exposure to the arts
of other cultures." 21 Indeed, scholars argue that the United States' soft
power-its ability to "attract others by the legitimacy of [its] policies and
the values which underlie them"-depends on the effectiveness of cultural
diplomatic efforts. 22
Syria's decision to opt out of the Metropolitan's Beyond Babylon
exhibit is just one example of the 2008 FSIA amendments' unforeseen and
unintended consequences. Rather than providing a new weapon against
terrorism or a means to compensate victims of terrorist acts, the FSIA's
terrorism exception aggravates already strained relations between the
United States and foreign nations that have historically sponsored terror-
ism directly or indirectly. 2 3 Therefore, to meet its goal of furthering diplo-
matic relations through cross-cultural exchange, the U.S. government must
take strides toward unifying American foreign policy.
Currently, the courts play a prominent role under the FSIA's terrorism
provisions, arguably usurping the executive's constitutional power to effec-
tively conduct foreign affairs. 24 The Constitution does not grant the execu-
tive branch exclusive control over foreign policy or national security;
however, many commentators argue that the president should exercise pri-
mary authority in this volatile field.25 At a minimum, the Supreme Court
has consistently held that the authority to shape foreign policy rests with
the legislature and executive. 26 Although the political branches may in
some sense share control over foreign affairs, it is the executive that is
responsible for maintaining diplomatic relations and plays the principal
role in forming and executing foreign policy.2 7 The view that, when the
two branches conflict, executive considerations should generally trump
congressional considerations originated in the Founding Era. 28 Given that
the Obama administration is focused on re-energizing American alli-
20. Position Paper, Ass'n of Art Museum Directors, Art Museums and the Interna-
tional Exchange of Cultural Artifacts (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.aamd.org/
papers/documents/CulturalProperty.000.pdf.
21. See id.
22. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Decline of America's Soft Power: Why Washington Should
Worry, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 16, 19 (May-June 2004) [hereinafter Nye, The Decline of
America's Soft Power].
23. See Kotlarczyk, supra note 12, at 2049 (characterizing citizens suits as "a clumsy
way to pursue what should be delicate diplomacy); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David
Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, 79 FOREIGN Ai'. 102, 113 (Sept. -Oct. 2000) ("The looming
presence of such judgments may actually make rogue governments defensive, discourag-
ing dialogue, engagement, political reform, and integration by these states into interna-
tonal legal and financial regimes.").
24. See Kotlarczyk, supra note 12, at 2050-51.
25. See id; H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority Over Foreign Affairs: An Exec-
utive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 527, 545-46 (1999).
26. See Powell, supra note 25, at 545 n.83.
27. See id. at 546.
28. See id. at 548.
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ances29-indeed, President Obama has already made strides toward
rebuilding ties with Syria3 0-the continued operation of the FSIA's terror-
ism provisions should be critically reassessed.
This Note examines the implications of the FSIA's terrorism exception
by focusing on how the 2008 amendments have interfered with American
museums' efforts at fostering international cultural exchange. Further-
more, this Note argues that it is not sound policy to allow victims of terror-
ism to sue foreign sovereigns at a time when the executive's foreign policy
goals include the use of cultural diplomacy as a bridge to connect with
countries that may be subject to the exception's waiver of immunity.
Finally, this Note suggests that Congress should repeal the FSIA's terror-
ism provisions entirely, especially in light of the exception's limited com-
pensatory and deterrence effects. Alternatively, Congress should delegate
authority to the President to waive the terrorism provision's applicability to
a designated state sponsor of terrorism in cases where the President deter-
mines that waiver will promote the security and diplomatic interests of the
United States.31
Part I of this Note traces the development of the American doctrine of
foreign sovereign immunity and presents the relevant congressional history
of the FSIA. Part 11 explores the role of the executive in shaping foreign
policy. Part III examines litigation involving the FSIA's terrorism provi-
sions, highlighting the shortcomings and implications of the current terror-
ism exception. Part IV discusses the foreign policy of the Obama
administration and draws inferences about the executive's view of the
FSIA's terrorism provisions. This Note concludes that Congress needs to
reexamine the validity of the terrorism exception to the FSIA and, in the
alternative, suggests avenues by which Congress could amend the FSIA to
avoid the unintended consequences of the present statutory framework.
1. Tracing the History of Foreign Sovereign Immunity Determinations
A. The Doctrine of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
It is an undisputed principle of domestic and international law that a
state should be free from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state. 32
The United States follows a restrictive view of sovereign immunity under
29. See White House, Foreign Policy, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-
policy (last visited May 24, 2010) ("The United States seeks to engage in dialogue that is
honest and grounded in mutual respect, as the best way to resolve disagreements and
work towards shared interests. We are committed to ... building new [partnerships] to
confront the challenges of the 21st century.").
30. See Mark Landler, Obama Will Send Envoy to Syria, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, June
24, 2009, at A10 ("President Obama has decided to send an ambassador to Syria after a
four-year hiatus ... in a sign of the deepening engagement between the Obama adminis-
tration and the Syrian government.").
31. See infra notes 106-16.
32. See Elizabeth L. Bahr, Comment, Is the Gavel Mightier than the Sword? Fighting
Terrorism in American Courts: The Problematic Implications of Using the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act to Compensate Military Victims of America's War on Terror, 15 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 1115, 1121 (2008).
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which sovereigns enjoy immunity for sovereign or public acts but not for
private acts.33 Although various justifications for the doctrine of sovereign
immunity have surfaced over time, the generally accepted explanation pro-
vides that "the subjection of... governments to private litigation might
constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions
and with their control over their respective instrumentalities, funds, and
property."3 4
Because U.S. jurisdiction over persons and property within its terri-
tory is not subject to external limitations, foreign states do not enjoy a
constitutional right to immunity in U.S. courts. 3 5 Rather, the Supreme
Court considers foreign state immunity to be a matter of grace and com-
ity.36 Accordingly, for the better part of American history the courts
looked to the political branches for guidance in determining whether to
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign; 37 in particular, the judiciary
often deferred to the executive branch, which frequently recommended
immunity for friendly sovereigns.38
In 1952, Jack B. Tate, the acting legal adviser to the Secretary of State
at the time, promulgated the Tate Letter.3 9 The Tate Letter supplanted the
doctrine of near absolute foreign sovereign immunity that had dominated
American courts for nearly two centuries with a "restrictive theory" of sov-
ereign immunity.40 The "restrictive theory" allows foreign sovereigns to
raise an immunity defense in cases involving public acts, but not private
acts, thereby narrowing the applicability of the defense. 4 1 Pursuant to the
Tate Letter, the State Department initiated a process to determine whether
a claim brought by a U.S. citizen against a foreign sovereign involved a
sovereign public or private act, either triggering or barring the defense of
sovereign immunity.4 2 Although the State Department did not consistently
distinguish between public and private acts, the courts continued to accept
the State Department's recommendations. 43 Indeed, the courts continued
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 451
cmt. a (1987).
34. See Joseph D. Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immu-
nity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1060, 1061 (1946).
35. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812). Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinion in Schooner Exchange is generally viewed as the source of U.S. foreign
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S.
677, 689 (2004).
36. See Republic of Austria, 541 U.S. at 689; Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity's
Penumbras: Common Law, "Accident," and Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immu-
nity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765, 780 (2008).
37. See Republic of Austria, 541 U.S. at 689.
38. See Florey, supra note 36, at 780-81.
39. See id. at 781.
40. See id.
41. See Bahr, supra note 32, at 1123.
42. See id.
43. See Florey, supra note 36, at 781; see also Republic of Austria, 514 U.S. at 690
("The change in State Department policy wrought by the 'Tate Letter' had little, if any
impact on federal courts' approach to the immunity analyses ... courts continued to
abide by [the State] Department's suggestions of immunity.").
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to embrace the view once extolled by Justice Stone, namely that courts
must refuse to exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns when to do so
would "embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting for-
eign relations."'44 In practice, therefore, the policy announced in the Tate
Letter led to unclear and inconsistent standards, often resulting in super-
fluous review. 45 Given the shortcomings of the Tate Letter and the per-
ceived need to intelligibly inform parties when the defense of immunity
would not bar suit against a foreign sovereign, Congress passed the FSIA in
1976.46
B. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The FSIA provides the comprehensive and exclusive statutory frame-
work that governs whether a foreign sovereign may raise the defense of
sovereign immunity.4 7 The Act, like the Tate Doctrine, codifies a restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity by generally granting a foreign sovereign
immunity to suit in the United States and enumerating instances under
which the defense will not bar an action.48 Therefore, a plaintiff may only
obtain jurisdiction over a foreign state defendant if the plaintiffs claim falls
under one of the Act's exceptions. 49 For example, the Act strips a foreign
state defendant of sovereign immunity in cases where the foreign state
waives immunity; 50 where the plaintiffs claim is based upon the foreign
state's commercial activity in the United States;5 1 or where rights in prop-
erty taken in violation of international law are at issue and the property is
present in the United States. 5 2 Furthermore, the Act governs the extent to
which a foreign state's property may be subject to attachment or execu-
tion.53 Notably, the Act firmly places sovereign immunity determinations
within the judgment of the courts-a sharp departure from nearly two hun-
dred years of judicial deference to the executive branch's recommenda-
44. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943).
45. See Republic of Austria, 541 U.S. at 690-91 (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 488 (1983)) ("Thus, [because responsibility fell to the
courts to determine whether sovereign immunity existed,] sovereign immunity determi-
nations were made in two different branches, subject to a variety of factors, sometimes
including diplomatic considerations. Not surprisingly, the government standards were
neither clear nor uniformly applied.").
46. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891;
Bahr, supra note 32, at 1125.
47. See Republic of Austria, 541 U.S. at 691 ("The FSIA [contains] a set of legal stan-
dards governing claims of immunity in every civil action against a foreign state ...")
(internal quotations omitted); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 12, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6610 [hereinafter HousE REPORT]. The House Report states that the
FSIA "sets forth the sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of
sovereign immunity."
48. See 28 U.S.C. §1605; Bahr, supra note 32, at 1125.
49. See Hilton, supra note 13, at 504-05.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
51. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
52. Id. § 1605(a)(3).
53. Id. §§ 1609-11.
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tions.54 By shifting such decision-making from the executive to the
judiciary, Congress hoped that the courts, free from political considera-
tions, would make impartial determinations. 55
Since 1976, Congress has continually expanded the scope of the FSIA,
creating new exceptions that prevent a foreign government from claiming a
defense of sovereign immunity and broadening the availability of foreign-
owned property and assets for attachment within the United States.56
Most notably, in 1996, Congress amended the FSIA to allow suits by U.S.
victims of terrorism against foreign states that the State Department
designates as state sponsors of terrorism. 5 7 As of April 2010, the State
Department listed four countries as state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba,
Iran, Sudan, and Syria.5 8 The State Department designates a country as a
state sponsor of terrorism if a country's government provides material sup-
port to terrorist groups, by means of funds, weapons, materials, or by pro-
viding a safe haven.5 9 The State Department may add or remove a country
from the list of state sponsors of terrorism at any time.60
Under the terrorism exception plaintiffs must satisfy five requirements
to obtain jurisdiction:
First, the claim must involve torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage,
hostage taking, or the provision of material support of resources for such
acts. Second, the act or provision of material support must be engaged in by
an official, employee, or agent of the foreign state acting within the scope of
54. See Bahr, supra note 32, at 1125.
55. See Allison Taylor, Note, Another Front in the War on Terrorism? Problems with
Recent Changes to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 45 AIz. L. REv. 533, 535 (2003).
56. See Bahr, supra note 32, at 1126.
57. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (1996) (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)); see also Taylor,
supra note 55, at 536 (noting that Congress added this amendment to the FSIA in part
because of lobbying by victims of terrorism and their families whose claims against state
sponsors of terrorism were unsuccessful).
58. OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, STATE DEP'T, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON TERROISM 181 (2009), available at http://terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/Coun-
try-Reports-Terrorism-2008.pdf [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM].
59. See id. The State Department designates state sponsors of terrorism under sec-
tion 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2405 (2004), or
§ 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2371. Consequences of
receiving the designation include: a ban on arms-related exports and sales, prohibitions
on economic assistance, imposition of financial restrictions, and exception from the
jurisdictional immunity in U.S. courts. Furthermore, current and former state sponsors
of terrorism, with the exception of Iraq, are unable to claim sovereign immunity as a
defense against a suit brought by a U.S. citizen for personal injury or death caused by
acts of terrorism that occurred within its territory. See id. Legislation requires the State
Department to publish annual reports that include assessments of the countries it
designates as state sponsors of terrorism. See 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(a)(1)(A)(ii).
60. See, e.g., COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM, supra note 58, at 181 ("On October 11,
the United States rescinded the designation of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK) as a state sponsor of terrorism in accordance with criteria set forth in U.S.
law, including a certification that the Government of North Korea had not provided any
support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the pro-
vision by the government of assurances that it will not support acts of international
terrorism in the future.").
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his or her duty. Third, the U.S. Secretary of State must have designated the
defendant state as a state sponsor of terrorism. Fourth, either the claimant
or victim must have been a U.S. national at the time of the act. Finally, if the
act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim is brought the
claimant must have afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to
arbitrate the claim in accordance with accepted international rules of
arbitration.6
1
Upon meeting these requirements, a plaintiff-victim of a terrorist act
may bring the responsible foreign sovereign before a federal district
court.6 2 Under the FSIA, successful plaintiffs may receive damages cover-
ing noneconomic harms and punitive damages, allowing for the possibility
of substantial judgments. 63
Congress passed the terrorism provisions in hope that the exception
would provide victims of terrorism monetary compensation for their suf-
fering and with the loftier goal of deterring hostile states from continuing
to engage in terrorist activity, whether directly or indirectly, by awarding
considerable damages to successful plaintiffs.6 4 However, in practice,
although plaintiffs were able to overcome the daunting defense of sovereign
immunity and secure victory by default, they remained unable to success-
fully collect on their judgments. 65 In 2008, Congress responded by
amending the FSIA in an attempt to facilitate plaintiffs' efforts to satisfy the
large judgments granted in their favor.6 6 The amendments garnered wide-
spread support across political lines and academia. 6 7 Indeed, commenta-
tors have hailed the amendments as a "novel approach to the problem of
terrorism," calling upon other countries to adopt legislation similar to the
FSIA's terrorism provisions.
68
Specifically, the 2008 amendments sought to clarify the 1996 amend-
ments and to overrule court decisions that had limited plaintiffs' abilities to
collect against foreign states.6 9 Significantly, the amendments codified the
terrorism exception as its own set of provisions within the FSIA, allowing
plaintiffs to bring claims seeking money damages against a foreign state
sponsor of terrorism directly and any agent of that foreign state acting
within the scope of employment, in a federal district court of the United
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2008); see also Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 13, at 504.
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2008); see also Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 13, at
504.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2008); see also Garmstein-Ross, supra note 13, at 504.
64. See Taylor, supra note 55, at 534.
65. See id. at 530.
66. See NDAA, supra note 14; see also Debra M. Strauss, Reaching Out to the Interna-
tional Community: Civil Lawsuits as the Common Ground in the Battle Against Terrorism,
19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 307, 327-28 (2009).
67. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, After Veto, House Passes a Revised Military Policy
Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2008, at A28 (noting that the bill passed by wide margins
in both houses).
68. Strauss, supra note 66, at 307-08 ("[T]his article emphasizes using a civil-not
military or retaliatory-approach to respond to matters of international terrorism.")
(emphasis in original).
69. See id. at 329.
389
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States.70 To ensure that plaintiffs have the possibility to collect on their
judgments, the Act now includes a measure that preserves assets of the
foreign state upon the filing of a lawsuit. 71 Thus, section 1605A(g)(1) cre-
ates an "automatic lien on all real or tangible personal property in the
name or control of the defendant state sponsor of terrorism without the
usual requirements of specificity and notice. '7 2 Plaintiffs no longer must
show that the foreign state exercises economic control over the targeted
property or that the foreign state receives profits from the property.7
3
Moreover, the FSIA now provides that "any property [located within the
United States] of a foreign state, or agency, or instrumentality of a foreign
state . . . shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or
execution upon a judgment entered under section 1605A."74 This last
measure is especially significant because it essentially renders any grant of
immunity by the State Department to loans of cultural objects from a for-
eign state sponsor of terrorism ineffectual. 7 5
The U.S. doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity has evolved from a
rigid bar to suit by U.S. individuals against almost all foreign nations, to a
system of case-by-case application based on executive determinations, to a
complicated statutory scheme of immunity stripping provisions created by
Congress and administered by the courts. Lurking behind the develop-
ment of a consistent doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity rests separa-
tion of powers issues. 76 Although the Constitution delegates authority to
both the executive and legislative branches in the arena of foreign affairs,7 7
confusion remains as to which body should trump the other when either
pursues a course of action that conflicts with the aims or foreign policy
goals of the other. 78
II. Separation of Powers and Foreign Policy
Traditionally, scholars and politicians have viewed the executive
branch as the organ of government responsible for protecting national
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008); see also Strauss, supra note 66, at 329 ("This develop-
ment effectively overrules ... Cicippio-Puelo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, which interpreted
section 1605 of the FSIA as a merely jurisdictional vehicle that does not confer a private
right of action against a foreign state and limited the Flatow Amendment to providing a
cause of action against officials, employees, and agents of the foreign state in their indi-
vidual capacity.").
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(g)(1) (2008).
72. See Strauss, supra note 66, at 331-32.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1) (2008); see also Strauss, supra note 66, at 332.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(2).
75. See AIA Statement, supra note 7.
76. See Jeewon Kim, Note and Comment, Making State Sponsors of Terrorism Pay: A
Separation of Powers Discourse Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 22 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 513, 538-39 (2004).
77. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 25, at 527 (discussing the Constitution's allocation of
foreign affairs powers between the President and Congress).
78. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over
Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 233 (2001) ("[Mlodern scholarship remains without a
coherent and complete theory of the constitutional division of foreign affairs powers.").
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security through the maintenance of diplomatic relations and, when neces-
sary, military force. 79 Recently, however, debate has increased over which
political branch-the executive or the legislative-retains primary control
over shaping foreign policy.80 The Constitution assigns responsibility for
the conduct of foreign policy to both political branches in a complicated
and indirect manner.8 1
Article II of the Constitution makes the President, "Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States;" 82 it delegates to the
President the power to "make Treaties," to "appoint Ambassadors, ''8 3 and to
"receive Ambassadors and other public ministers. '8 4 Moreover, the Consti-
tution provides that the President "take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."'8 5 This amalgam of powers provides strong support for the view
of the President as the "constitutional representative" of the United States
in the foreign relations arena.8 6 Indeed, many of the Founding Fathers
expressed their belief that the Constitution granted the President "plenary
and exclusive authority over the conduct of foreign affairs."8 7 Since the
founding, Presidents have claimed, as a matter of constitutional right,
responsibility for shaping the U.S. foreign policy.8 8
The executive branch's belief in its control over foreign affairs does not
stem from a belief in its omnipotence, but rather from centuries of judicial
and, at times, legislative deference.8 9 Although congressional deference to
the executive branch may rarely occur, there have been instances where
Congress has delegated its foreign affairs powers to the discretion of the
President. 90 Moreover, even Chief Justice Marshall, who famously
79. See Kim, supra note 76, at 525.
80. See Powell, supra note 25, at 527-28.
81. See id. at 545.
82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
83. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
84. Id. art. I1, § 3.
85. Id.
86. See Powell, supra note 25, at 547.
87. See id. at n.86 (citing Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Question of Whether
the Senate Has the Right to Negative the Grade of Persons Appointed by the Executive to
Fill Foreign Missions (Apr. 24, 1790), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 161, 161
(Paul L. Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1895)) ("The transaction of business
with foreign nations is executive altogether; it belongs, then, to the head of that
department ... ").
88. See id. at 548.
89. See id. at 555 ("[Elxecutive primacy in foreign affairs and national security is a
faithful exposition not only of judicial precedent and historical practice, but also of the
fundamental notion that the Constitution is meant to provide checks on the tendency of
power, including executive power, to become arbitrary.").
90. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002,
HJ. Res. 114, 107th Cong., 116 Sat. 1498, 1501 (2002) (authorizing the President to
initiate hostilities with Iraq "as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order
... to defend the national security of the United States."); Doe v. Bush, 323 F. 3d 133
(1st Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' claim that Congress' delegation of its
power to declare war to Iraq to the President violated the Constitution); U.S. v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Co., 299 U.S. 304, 324 n.2 (1936) (listing examples where Congress has
delegated to the President to use his unrestricted judgment when acting with respect to
subjects involving foreign relations).
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entrenched the independence of the Court to the chagrin of the Execu-
tive, 9 1 acknowledged the primacy of the executive in international
affairs.9 2  Indeed, the Court has consistently echoed "the generally
accepted view that foreign policy [is] the province and responsibility of the
Executive."'93 Absent direct and contrary congressional action, the Court
has remained unwilling to question the authority of the executive with
respect to national security affairs, which must inevitably include general
foreign policy objectives.94
In U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., the Court distinguished the appli-
cation of the maxim "the federal government can exercise no powers except
those specifically enumerated in the Constitution" as between internal and
external affairs.95 In that case, the Court suggested that the Framers were
not as explicit when assigning foreign policy powers because they did not
fear infringing upon the rights and powers of the individual states.96
Indeed, the Court contended that although the Constitution enumerates
some foreign affairs' powers, even if it had remained completely silent on
the subject, the federal government would still have inherited the power to
shape foreign policy as a consequence of nationality. 9 7 The Court
continued:
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations,
embarrassment-perhaps serious embarrassment-is to be avoided and suc-
cess for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made
effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must
often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statu-
tory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved. 9 8
Moreover, the Court highlighted the executive's superior position with
respect to fact gathering as a compelling reason for granting the President
sole authority in the arena of international relations. 99 Therefore, in addi-
tion to constitutional arguments, there are pragmatic factors which tip the
91. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing the doctrine
of judicial review).
92. See Curtiss-Wright Exp. Co., 299 U.S. at 319 ("The President is the sole organ of
the nation in its external, and its sole representative with foreign nations.") (quoting
Justice John Marshall).
93. Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (quoting Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981)).
94. Id.
95. See Curtiss-Wright Exp. Co., 299 U.S. at 315-16 ("The broad statement that the
federal government can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the
Constitution ... is categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs.").
96. See id. at 316.
97. See id. at 316, 318 ("As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the
colonies ... the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown ... to the colo-
nies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America.").
98. See id. at 320.
99. See id. ("[The President], not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing
the conditions which prevail in foreign countries . . .")
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balance of foreign-relations control in the executive's favor. 100
A combination of these observations supports the argument that,
because the Constitution does not articulate which political branch is
directly responsible for shaping and executing U.S. foreign policy, the exec-
utive branch should be allowed to exercise de facto primary control in the
arena of foreign affairs.101 This comports with historical precedent: when
determining whether a foreign state could assert the defense of sovereign
immunity in a U.S. court, the historic judicial practice had been to defer to
the executive branch's recommendations.
10 2
Although many commentators are unwilling to view foreign affairs as
the exclusive province of the executive, the proposition that the President
has the power to devise and declare foreign policy seems an acceptable
concession to those who argue for more congressional control. 10 3 Indeed
it is a well-established belief, even if not explicitly constitutionally based,
that the President, not Congress, has the authority to declare the United
States' views on international matters. 10 4 Nevertheless, Congress often
indirectly shapes U.S. foreign policy in the course of developing and pass-
ing legislation. 10 5 For example, the adoption of the FSIA symbolizes legis-
lative intervention in a domain traditionally controlled by the executive.
Congress's decision to take action with regard to foreign sovereign immu-
nity determinations does not need to be rebuffed-certainly, as the legisla-
tive body of the federal government, Congress should improve upon
inefficient processes, even in an area that affects foreign policy. 10 6 Partici-
pation by Congress within the arena of foreign affairs, however, demands
cooperation, not contradiction, with the executive branch. Indeed, if the
President's foreign policy is to move from rhetoric to action, he will need
the lawmaking powers of the legislature. 10 7 Congressional support in the
field of international relations, however, requires that Congress "accord to
100. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 32
(2d ed. 1996) (listing factors including the President's control of information and ability
to act quickly as advantages with respect to foreign relations).
101. See Powell, supra note 25, at 529 (supporting "executive primacy"-the belief that
the President is vested with the primary authority to control foreign affairs and national
security).
102. Bahr, supra note 32, at 1125 (describing the history of sovereign immunity
determinations).
103. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 78, at 262-63.
104. See id. ("Thus, the basic outlines of foreign affairs authority have generally been
correctly understood, although their constitutional basis has become obscured."); see
also HENKIN, supra note 100, at 44-45 (listing examples of President's actions that
express the U.S. foreign policy without any consideration toward the approval or opin-
ion of Congress).
105. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 78, at 262-63.
106. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1935)
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not
and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on
isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context. While the Constitution dif-
fuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate
the dispersed powers into a workable government.").
107. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 78, at 263 ("[T]he President must often look
to Congress as a partner in foreign affairs endeavors.").
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the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved."' 0 8
In Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, a recent Supreme Court case involving the
FSIA's terrorism provisions, the Court inadvertently highlighted the
favorability of congressional and executive compromise. 10 9 Congress's ini-
tial attempt to amend the FSIA's terrorism exception directly conflicted
with President Bush's foreign policy goals with respect to Iraq. 110 Indeed,
because the provisions applied to past and current designated state spon-
sors of terrorism, President Bush feared that potential liability to victims of
terrorism under the FSIA could threaten Iraq at a "crucial juncture" in its
history."' Therefore, when Congress failed to include a provision that
waived the terrorism exception's applicability to Iraq, President Bush
vetoed the bill. 1 12 In the end, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 included the FSIA's current terrorism exception and a
provision satisfying President Bush's demands. 1 13 On the same day that
the Act passed, President Bush exercised his authority and effectively
deemed Iraq immune to suit under the FSIA's terrorism exception. 1" 4 In
Beaty, the Court upheld the waiver provision because of the well-estab-
lished practice of granting the President the power to suspend the opera-
tion of a valid law in the sphere of foreign affairs. 11 5 The Court found "the
granting of Presidential waiver authority ... particularly apt with respect to
congressional elimination of foreign sovereign immunity, since the grant-
ing or denial of that immunity was historically the case-by-case prerogative
of the Executive Branch." 1 16 Therefore, the plaintiffs who had suffered
under the regime of Saddam Hussein were unable to proceed with their suit
against Iraq because the FSIA no longer provided an exception to Iraq's
immunity defense, although Iraq had, at the time of the terrorist act, been a
designated sponsor of terrorism. 1 17
Historically, the executive branch exercised nearly exclusive control
108. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Co., 299 U.S. at 320; see also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17
(1965) ("[Blecause of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary interna-
tional relations, and the fact that the Executive is immediately privy to information ... ,
Congress-in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs-must of
necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas.")
109. See Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. 2183 (2009)
110. See, e.g., id. at 2188; Herszenhorn, supra note 67, at A28.
111. See, e.g., Beaty.
112. See Herszenhorn, supra note 67, at A28.
113. NDAA, supra note 14, at 122 Stat. 343 ("The President may waive any provision
of this exception with respect to Iraq . . . if the President determines that the waiver is in
the national security interest of the United States.").
114. See 73 Fed. Reg. 6571, No. 2008-9 (2008) ("The economic security and success-
ful reconstruction of Iraq continue to be top national security priorities of the United
States. [The terrorism exception of the FSIA] threatens those key priorities.").
115. See Beaty, 129 S.Ct. at 2189.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 2195.
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over foreign affairs."1 8 However, notwithstanding judicial and legislative
deference toward executive foreign sovereign immunity determinations for
nearly two centuries, Congress enacted the FSIA, ushering a new era in the
U.S. doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity. 1 9 Regardless of which, or if
either, branch exercises exclusive or superior control over foreign affairs, it
is clear that foreign policy, diplomatic relations, and international comity
would benefit from a critical reexamination of the FSIA's terrorism
exception.
Ill. Playing Tug-of-War with Ancient Cultural Objects
In practice, the FSIA's terrorism provision fails to compensate the
overwhelming majority of terrorist victims who use the FSIA to bring
claims before federal district courts. 120 Furthermore, there is no empirical
evidence that supports the argument that the provision deters state spon-
sors of terrorism. 1 2  Indeed, rather than providing the United States with
a tool to combat global terrorism, the provisions have frustrated legitimate,
non-governmental attempts to open and foster diplomatic relations with
foreign states that have traditionally been antagonistic toward the United
States. 122
A. Case-Study: Rubin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran 12 3
The story of the nine individual plaintiffs in Rubin 1 24 serves as a typi-
cal example of the obstacles and failures that the majority of terrorist vic-
tims encounter when seeking redress under the FSIA. In 1997, five of the
nine plaintiffs suffered horrific and life-altering injuries stemming from a
suicide bombing in Jerusalem; the other four plaintiffs suffered emotional
harm as a result of injured family members. 1 2 5 Hamas, an Islamic militant
terrorist organization, claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack; Israeli
officials arrested and convicted members of the organization for orchestrat-
ing the bombing. 1 2 6 Soon after, the Rubin plaintiffs brought actions
against Hamas and the Islamic Republic of Iran for providing material sup-
port for the attack.
1 27
118. See, e.g., Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943) (following
judicial policy of deferring to State Department recommendations when determining
whether sovereign immunity will bar suit).
119. See Bahr, supra note 32, at 1125.
120. See Taylor, supra note 55, at 537.
121. See id. at 534.
122. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 3, at 1 (detailing how a private action under the
FSIA's terrorism provisions derailed the Metropolitan Museum of Art's attempt to
engage in cultural exchange with the Syrian government).
123. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2007 WL 2219105, at *1 (N.D. Ill., July 26,
2007).
124. See Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261-62
(D.D.C. 2003).
125. See id. at 261.
126. See id. at 261-62.
127. See id.
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The district court found that the FSIA provided a jurisdictional basis
for the suit against Iran.'1 2  However, none of the named defendants,
including high-ranking members of the Iranian government that held office
at the time of the bombing, appeared. 1 2 9 The court then held a hearing to
obtain the relevant evidence necessary to enter a default judgment. 130
Plaintiffs proved that the bomb-maker in the attack received training from
Iranian agents; accordingly, the court awarded plaintiffs damages totaling
nearly $400 million. 131
Ever since the district court handed down this considerable judgment,
the plaintiffs have been on a wild goose chase to collect damages. To date,
the Rubin plaintiffs have been unable to collect even a meaningful portion
of the sum the district court awarded to them. 13 2 Initially, the plaintiffs
attempted to attach several bank accounts associated with the Consulate
General of Iran. 13 3 The court ruled that the funds were not being used for
diplomatic purposes and that they were subject to attachment by the Rubin
plaintiffs. 1 34 But the plaintiffs could not collect because a prior judgment
creditor held a lien on the funds.13 5 Next, the plaintiffs attempted to
attach assets held by the Iranian government at the Bank of New York, only
to face similar defeat. 13 6 Finally, in 2005, the Rubin plaintiffs enjoyed a
minimal court victory when U.S. Marshals sold a residence owned by an
Iranian prince in Lubbock, Texas for approximately $390,000-a fraction
of their total judgment. 1 37
Frustrated by the minimal gains made by their lengthy and expensive
efforts to execute upon traditional assets, the Rubin plaintiffs focused their
attention on Persian antiquities held by the Field Museum and the Univer-
sity of Chicago's Oriental Institute. 1 38 Initially, the plaintiffs asserted that
128. See id. at 269-71 (discussing the satisfaction of the FSIA element by element).
129. See id. at 261.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 270-71 (awarding the plaintiffs $71.5 million in compensatory dam-
ages and $300 million in punitive damages).
132. See Hilton, supra note 13, at 494-95 (describing the plaintiffs several failed
attempts at attaching assets to pay the judgment).
133. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2005 WL 670770, at *1 (D.D.C. 2005),
vacated by Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 563 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2008); id.at
494.
134. See id. at *4.
135. See Hilton, supra note 13, at 494.
136. See id. at 495-96.
137. See id. at 495.
138. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1109-11 (N.D. Ill.
2004); see also Hilton, supra note 13, at 480 ("[T]he [Rubin] plaintiffs seek to attach the
Persepolis Tablets, the Chogha Mish Collection, the Herzfeld Collection at the Field
Museum of Natural History and other Persian artifacts owned by Iran that are held at
the University of Chicago's famed Oriental Institute."). The plaintiffs also brought
actions in Massachusetts and Michigan. In those districts, however, it is uncertain
whether Iran owns the artifacts sought for attachment, while in Illinois Iranian owner-
ship has been conceded. See James Wawrzyniak, Rubin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran: A
Struggle for Control of Persian Antiquities in America 9, 14 (HAiv. L. SCH. STUDENT SCHOL-
ARSHIP SERIES, Paper 17 2007), available at http://sr.nellco.orgcgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti-
cle=1017&context=harvardstudents.
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the antiquities held at the Chicago museums fell under the "commercial
activity" exception to immunity from attachment. 139 That is to say the
plaintiffs argued that "because the collections have been used for publish-
ing and selling books in the United States" the antiquities should be sub-
ject to attachment. 140 In 2006, the district court held that Iranian
interests, including defenses against the plaintiffs, could not be raised by a
third party such as the museums housing the collections.1 4 1 The court's
holding led Iran to acquire U.S. counsel to represent its interests directly,
further prolonging a final resolution. 14 2 Since the Rubin plaintiffs regis-
tered their judgment in the Northern District of Illinois, the plaintiffs, sev-
eral museums, and the Iranian government have been engaged in a tug-of-
war over control of ancient Persian artifacts. 14 3
The 2008 amendments to the FSIA signaled yet another chapter in the
Rubin litigation. 144 Specifically, the new terrorism provisions provide an
easier mechanism for plaintiffs seeking to satisfy judgments entered under
§1605A. 145 Pursuant to the amendments, the Rubin plaintiffs re-filed their
action in the District Court for the District of Columbia. 146 Encouraged by
the modified statutory framework, the Rubin plaintiffs believed that they
were finally nearing the redress they had sought for over a decade, unaware
that their efforts would once again be derailed by an unforeseen obstacle.
In the same month that the Rubin plaintiffs re-filed, another group of
nearly 1,000 plaintiffs also sought to enforce their judgment against Iran in
the District Court for the District of Columbia. 147 The plaintiffs in Peter-
son v. Islamic Republic of Iran are the family members of the 241 service
members killed in the 1983 bombing of a United States Marine barrack in
Beirut, Lebanon.14 8 Similar to Rubin, Iran played a material role in funding
the terrorist organization which carried out the attack in Beirut. 149 Iran
also failed to appear in the Peterson litigation, prompting the court to enter
default judgment for the plaintiffs and compensatory damages against the
139. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) ("The property in the United States of a foreign state ...
used for commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from attachment
in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United
States .. ").
140. Rubin, 349 F. Supp. at 1110-11. Ultimately the court ruled that the Iran's con-
duct was not commercial. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24376, at *23. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs have continued to pursue litigation in the
Northern District Illinois under the theory that the American museums are agents of
Iran, and that the acts of the museums bring Iran within the commercial activity excep-
tion. See id.
141. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 436 F. Supp. 2d 938, 946 (N.D. Il. 2006).
142. See Hilton, supra note 13, at 507.
143. See Rubin, 349 F. Supp. at 1109 (noting that the Oriental Institute of the Univer-
sity of Chicago participated in the proceeding as respondent); Hilton, supra note 13, at
495-97.
144. See Hilton, supra note 13, at 498-99.
145. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1); see also supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
146. See Hilton, supra note 13, at 499.
147. See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D.D.C. 2007).
148. See id. at 36-37.
149. See Hilton, supra note 13, at 500.
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defendants totaling nearly $3 billion.15 0 Consequently, in a disturbing
turn of events, the 2008 FSIA amendments have pitted victims of Iranian
supported terrorism against one another.' 5 '
The Rubin plaintiffs' attempts to attach the Persian antiquities located
in Chicago continued on October 26, 2009, when the Seventh Circuit
heard oral arguments in Iran's appeal of a 2007 district court decision that
required Iran to disclose a list of Iranian-owned assets in the United
States.152 To date there has been no decision. However, even if the Seventh
Circuit's decision favors the Rubin plaintiffs, they will still have to with-
stand the competing judgment of the Peterson plaintiffs, whose multi-bil-
lion dollar judgment may leave the Rubin plaintiffs empty-handed once
again.
The Rubin litigation represents the typical uphill battle that victims of
terrorism face when seeking redress from a state sponsor of terrorism.' 53
Over the course of seven years, despite legislative amendments and judicial
proceedings in multiple federal districts, the Rubin plaintiffs are no closer
to executing upon their substantial judgment. Indeed, the Rubin plaintiffs
have overcome one obstacle after another only to encounter unexpected
foes and mounting legal fees.1 54 Regrettably, Congress's worthy intention
of providing victims of state sponsored terrorism a forum to seek compen-
sation is not being met under the FSIA's current rubric. 155 Moreover, aside
from granting plaintiffs jurisdiction to bring a cause of action with no ade-
quate remedy, there is little by way of empirical proof to support the belief
that the provisions have or will deter state sponsored acts of terrorism.
B. Analyzing the Deterrence Argument
Measuring trends in global terrorism is difficult in the abstract; when
attempting to isolate state sponsored acts of terrorism from the aggregate,
the task of assessing what, if any, deterrent effect the FSIA's terrorism pro-
visions have becomes nearly impossible. The National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) is responsible for national and international counterterror-
ism efforts.15 6 The NCTC releases annual reports on global terrorism, pro-
viding statistics and information about attacks in the previous year and
notes on future trends. 15 7 Its 2009 report did not include specific statisti-
150. See Peterson, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 60.
151. See Hilton, supra note 13, at 501.
152. See Lynne Marek, DOJ Urges 7th Circuit to Shield Iranian Artifacts from Seizure by
Terrorism Victims, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 2, 2009, available at, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.
jsp?id=1202435093688&DOJ Urges-thCircuit toShieldIranianArtifacts From_
Seizure.byTerrorism_Victims.
153. See Hilton, supra note 13, at 481.
154. See id. at 495.
155. See supra notes 138-51 and accompanying text.
156. See National Counterterrorism Center, http://www.nctc.gov/aboutus/about
nctc.html.
157: See id.
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cal information on state sponsored acts of terrorism, 158 but in a 2006
report submitted to Congress, its researchers noted a decline in instances
of state sponsored terrorism. 159 However, the report went on to suggest a
few notable exceptions including ongoing support of terrorist organiza-
tions by Iran and Syria, two of the four countries designated by the State
Department as state sponsors of terrorism. 160
A 2009 report released by the American Security Project (ASP)
announced that state sponsorship of terrorism "remains at historically low
levels.' 16 1 However, a more in depth analysis of the report undermines
that general finding, suggesting the need to evaluate other factors when
assessing a state's direct or indirect involvement with terrorist organiza-
tions. For example, ASP notes that there is no differentiation "between
those countries who are genuine partners in counter-terrorism and those
who tolerate terrorist organizations within their borders or turn a blind eye
to terrorist fundraising.' 6 2 Indeed, the report cautions against relying too
heavily on the statistical information released by the U.S. government
because there are often political and diplomatic considerations that influ-
ence how a country's counterterrorism efforts are actually measured.' 63
Next, the report goes on to stratify state-sponsored terrorism into cate-
gories, including the following: (1) active sponsors,164 (2) agreements with
terrorists, 16 5 (3) tolerate fundraising, 16 6 (4) tolerate presence, 16 7 (5) fail-
158. See NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, 2008 REPORT ON TERRORISM (Apr.30,
2009), available at, http://wits.nctc.gov/ReportPDF.do?f=crt2008nctcannexfinal.pdf.
[hereinafter NCTC REPORT].
159. See CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, TRENDS IN TERRORISM: 2006, 6 (July 21, 2006),
available at, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/69479.pdf ("The report sug-
gests that active, direct, state sponsorship of terror is declining.").
160. See id.
161. See Christine Bartolf & Bernard I. Finel, Are We Winning? Measuring Progress in
the Struggle Against Al Qaeda and Associated Movements, AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT, 1,
18 (2009), available at, http://www.americansecurityproject.org/resources/2009_AWW.
pdf; see also American Security Project, http://www.americansecurityproject.org/con-
tent/about/ ("[ASP] is a non-profit, bipartisan public policy and research organization
dedicated to fostering knowledge and understanding of a range of national security
issues, promoting debated about the appropriate use of American power, and cultivating
strategic responses to 21st century challenges.").
162. Id., at 18.
163. See e.g., id. ("North Korea was only recently dropped off the state sponsorship
list, despite only a cursory mention of actual state sponsorship. Countries that have
strong diplomatic and economic relations with countries designated as state sponsors of
terror are not rebuked in reports. Designations and details in these State Department
reports should therefore be taken as an informative, but political, work-not as a full
description of a country's counterterrorism efforts.").
164. See id. at 19 ("Active sponsors are countries that directly support terrorist orga-
nizations with funds, arms, and intelligence. They also provide political support to ter-
rorist groups and largely refuse to cooperate with international efforts to reign in
terrorism.").
165. See id. ("[A]greements [with terrorists] include offers of amnesty in return for
unverified cooperation.").
166. See id. ("[Includes] states that tolerate . .. fundraising and knowingly allow
agents of terrorist groups to operate on their soil and openly solicit funds for their activi-
ties abroad.").
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ure to prosecute and failure to pass or implement laws. 168 Only three
countries are categorized as active sponsors, including Iran, Syria, and Ven-
ezuela, which is not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by the State
Department. 169 Significantly, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Pakistan, and Yemen-
none of which are included on the State Department's list of designated
state sponsors of terrorism-are noted as states that tolerate the presence
of known terrorists within their borders.' 70 Lastly, over ten countries-
from Brazil to Mauritania and Turkmenistan-are listed as states "that have
failed to pass laws and regulations" to combat terrorism yet have the capac-
ity to implement such a regulatory system. 171
The ASP study calls into question the feasibility of acquiring data that
could ever factually support the arguments of proponents of the current
statutory framework who believe that the threat of suit and civil liability
will likely discourage continued state-sponsored terrorism. 172 Indeed,
threat of civil suit is but one of a number of sanctions imposed on coun-
tries designated as state sponsors of terrorism; perhaps the threat of
"prohibitions on economic assistance" is what is truly deterring countries
from supporting terrorism. 173 Iran and Syria, two of the four countries
against which individuals can bring suit under the FSIA, still engage in
state-sponsored terrorism.' 74 Moreover, even if active state-sponsored ter-
rorism is at an all time low, overall rates of global terrorism remain high,
which begs the question: is the designation process reaching all the foreign
sovereigns that engage in, directly or indirectly, state-sponsored
terrorism?175
Although the aim of the FSIA's terrorism exception is honorable, its
backward-looking focus presents American diplomatic efforts as two-
faced.' 76 No one can deny that the victims of terrorist acts deserve justice
and an opportunity to receive amends; however, given the cost and length
of litigating FSIA cases and the low likelihood of being able to satisfy judg-
ments, the political branches should reevaluate the continued utility of the
167. See id. ("[S]tates that tolerate the presence of known terrorists on their soil and
fail to either arrest or extradite terrorist operatives.").
168. See id. ("Countries that have failed to pass laws and regulations to enforce their
international obligations.").
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See e.g., Perles & Lajeunesse, supra note 15, at 9-10 (calling on the Obama
administration to depart from the Bush administration's policy and embrace the bene-
fits of the FSIA's terrorism provisions).
173. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (2006).
174. See NCTC REPORT, supra note 158, at 19.
175. See id. at 13 ("Approximately 11,800 terrorist attacks against noncombatants
occurred in various countries during 2008, resulting in over 54,000 deaths, injuries and
kidnappings."); see, e.g., RAY WALSER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, STATE SPONSORS OF TER-
RORISM: TIME TO ADD VENEZUELA TO THE LIST, , (2010), available at http://www.heritage.
org/Research/Reports/2010/01/State-Sponsors-of-Terrorism-Time-to-Add-Venezuela-to-
the-List.
176. See CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, SUITS AGAINST TERRORIST STATES, 9, 12-13 (Jan.
25, 2002) available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/8045.pdf.
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terrorism provisions. Furthermore, given the questionable deterrent effect
of the provisions, the struggle against global terrorism may be better served
by a different tactical approach, or at the least, by the synchronization of
U.S. foreign policy objectives. A meaningful and critical inspection will
lead to a more successful avenue of redress for victims of terrorism and
stronger diplomatic relations with currently disenfranchised states.
C. Collateral Damage: Cultural Diplomacy
Scholars and political leaders have long recognized the value of cul-
tural diplomacy-the fostering of understanding between citizenry of dif-
ferent nations through the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other
influential aspects of culture. 177 Cultural diplomacy strongly contributes
to what political scientist Joseph Nye describes as a nation's soft power-
the "ability to get what [it] want[s] through attraction rather than through
coercion."'178 Critics of the theory favor traditional forms of hard power,
such as militaristic or economic might, over the subtle and less quantitative
instruments of soft power. 1 79 According to Nye, "soft power arises from
the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideas, and policies.
When [a nation's] policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, [that
nation's] soft power is enhanced."180 Indeed, in the years leading up to
World War II, President Roosevelt recognized cultural diplomacy as a valu-
able tool of persuasion in the struggle against Fascism. 18 1
It was during the Cold War, however, when cultural diplomacy took
on a significant role in shaping the U.S. foreign policy. 182 In 1948, Con-
gress enacted the Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948; rele-
vant language from the Act reveals the primacy of cultural diplomacy in the
struggle against communism:
The purpose and objectives of this program are to "enable the Government
of the United States to promote a better understanding of the United States
in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the people
of the United States and the people of other countries." Among the means to
be used in achieving these objectives is the international exchange of per-
sons, knowledge, and skills. 18 3
177. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CULTURAL
DIPLOMACY, CULTURAL DIPLOMACY THE LINCHPIN OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 3 (Sept. 2005)
[hereinafter CULTURAL DIPLOMACY REPORT].
178. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, 119 POLITCAL SCIENCE
QUARTERLY 255, 256 (2004) [hereinafter Nye, Soft Power and Foreign Policy]
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See CENTER FOR ARTS AND CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY 29
(Nov. 2001), available at, http://www.culturalpolicy.org/pdf/globalization.pdf ("The
attempted seduction by the Axis powers of our allies in Latin America led American
decision makers to involve the cultural aspects of diplomacy as yet another means of
counteracting the influence of Fascism in the region. This effort provided the basis for
post-war uses of cultural diplomacy to support the spread of Western democratic
notions.") [hereinafter GLOBALIZATION & CULTURAL DIPLOMACY].
182. See Cummings, supra note 17, at 4-11.
183. J. Manuel Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy, 1936-
1948, in BUREAU OF EDUCATIONAL & CULTURAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CULTURAL
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From academic exchange programs, like the Fulbright Scholarship, to
translations of literature and visual arts exhibitions that introduced Ameri-
can artistic movements to countries around the world, the United States
engaged in a two-front attack against the Soviet Union.' 8 4 Accordingly, as
the Cold War lingered on, the government came to rely on the efforts of
non-profits and private sector organizations to aid in the promulgation of
American culture and ideals to the global community. 18 5 Thus, through
the use of cultural diplomacy the United States projected a favorable-and
apolitical-image of American society abroad, relying on cultural exchange
to form alliances with other nations that shared cultural commonalities
with the United States. 186 Indeed, Nye argues that it was the successful
combination of hard and soft powers that allowed the United States to
form a system of alliances that eventually brought down the Iron
Curtain.'18 7
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States has emerged as the
world's sole hegemonic power.' 8 8 However, America's image within the
international community has since plummeted.' 8 9 Although cultural
diplomacy played a role in shaping U.S. foreign policy for over half a cen-
tury, recent presidential administrations have abandoned the lessons of the
Cold War, favoring more visible sources of strength or hard power. 190
With the advent of global terrorism, however, scholars urge political lead-
ers to build a new system of diplomatic alliances to combat extremism and
engage in cultural diplomacy with countries that traditionally share less
cultural and historic ties to the United States. 19 1
Museums provide the perfect setting for cultural diplomacy. Indeed,
museums have fully embraced the importance of "two-way" cultural diplo-
macy. By engaging in diverse cross-cultural exchange, museums provide
Americans with the opportunity to learn about less familiar cultures
RELATIONS PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, HISTORICAL STUDIES: NUMBER 2,
342 (1976), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_
storage_01/0000019b/80/36/lc/e5.pdf.
184. See Cummings, supra note 17, at 4-5.
185. See GLOBALIZATION & CULTURAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 181, at 28 ("[T]he biggest
players have been large foundations, non-profit organizations, and academic institutions
.... [which] funded education, research, artistic touring companies and international
exchanges of all kinds.").
186. See id.
187. See Nye, The Decline of America's Soft Power, supra note 22, at 16.
188. See id.
189. See Nye, Soft Power and Foreign Policy, supra note 178, at 255.
190. See Nye, The Decline of America's Soft Power, supra note 22, at 19-20 ("The
United States' most striking failure is the low priority and paucity of resources it has
devoted to producing soft power. The combined cost of the State Department's public
diplomacy programs ... is just over a billion dollars, about four percent of the nation's
international affairs budget. That total is about three percent of what the United States
spends on intelligence and a quarter of one percent of its military budget.").
191. See, e.g., CULTURAL DIPLOMACY REPORT, supra note 177, at 1 ("[C]ultural diplo-
macy can enhance our national security in subtle, wide-ranging and sustainable ways
.... For the values embedded in our artistic and intellectual traditions form a bulwark
against the forces of darkness.").
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through the visual arts. 192 Accordingly, cultural diplomacy's promise of
international support through cooperation is furthered each time an Amer-
ican sees a piece of art and understands or identifies with the culture that
produced it.1 93 For example, the Metropolitan Museum of Art's 2008
Beyond Babylon offered viewers a vision of the ancient Near East in terms
familiar to the modern American: globalization and diversity. 19 4 However,
the overall effect of the exhibition was undermined by Syria's decision not
to participate:
[Tihe Metropolitan's inability to borrow objects from Syria for an exhibition
indicates the danger [the FSIA] legislation and litigation pose to cultural
exchange. American citizens have been deprived of the opportunity of
appreciating and learning from archaeological artifacts and works of art
from one of the world's oldest civilizations. The actions in question there-
fore pose a serious threat to cultural exchange and cultural diplomacy,
which are extremely important in building understanding among
peoples. 1
95
Furthermore, cultural exchange allows American academics and
archaeologists to study important artifacts, to publish their findings, and
to translate their meaning to society at large. 19 6 The University of Chi-
cago's Oriental Institute, a party of interest in Rubin, discovered clay tablets
in Iran in 1933, and with the permission of the Iranian government is still
studying the significance of the artifacts. 1 9 7 Each year, as archaeologists
decipher the ancient writing on the tablets, they discover more about the
sophistication of daily life in Ancient Persia. 198 However, with the Rubin
plaintiffs seeking attachment, the cultural exchange and comity that devel-
oped between the Oriental Institute and Iran for over half a century has
been placed on hold indefinitely. 199
Diplomatic ties with Syria, a designated state sponsor of terror, are
precisely the type that could benefit from increased cross-cultural
exchange.200 The U.S. government, however, must make greater strides
toward providing a lasting support system for public diplomacy before
American museums can effectively engage in cultural diplomacy. 20 1
192. See id.
193. See AIA Statement, supra note 7, at 2.
194. See Cotter, supra note 3, at C25.
195. AIA Statement, supra note 7, at 2.
196. See University of Chicago, Press Release, University of Chicago Returns Ancient
Persian tablets Loaned by Iran (Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://www-news.uchicago.
edu/releases/04/040428.tablets.shtml.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See Daniel Pipes, The University of Chicago vs. Victims of Terror, Nov. 22, 2009,
http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/2006/06/the-university-of-chicago-vs-victims-of.
200. See, e.g., DeVoss, supra note 19 (noting the improvement in U.S. and Chinese
diplomatic relations as a result of a series of ping-pong games between American and
Chinese players).
201. See CULTURAL DIPLOMACY REPORT, supra note 177, at 1 ("lW]hen our nation is at
war, every tool in the diplomatic kit bag is employed, including the promotion of cultural
activities. But when peace returns, culture gets short shrift, because of our traditional
lack of public support for the arts. Now that we are at war again, interest in cultural
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Indeed, until the FSIA terror provisions are revised, or at least until attach-
ment of cultural property is unquestionably barred, Cuba, Iran, Sudan,
and Syria are unlikely to participate in cultural exchanges with American
institutions, severely limiting the potential reach and effectiveness of cul-
tural diplomacy. 20 2 The emergence of global terrorism as an international
security threat has recharged scholarly debate about the need to reassert
America's soft power through cultural diplomacy.20 3 Perhaps through the
exchange of art, ideological schisms may slowly be bridged and diplomatic
ties forged between the United States and countries both officially desig-
nated as state sponsors of terrorism, and unofficially recognized as sup-
porting terrorist organizations.
IV. Foreign Policy under the Obama Administration
During his campaign for the presidency, Barack Obama cited
renewing American diplomatic efforts as a top foreign policy priority.20 4
Significantly, President Obama remains committed not only to strengthen-
ing existing alliances, but also to fostering relations with currently hostile
nations, including Iran.20 5 Since taking office, Obama has already taken
steps toward fulfilling his campaign promises. In June of 2009, Obama
visited Egypt and gave his now famous speech at the University of Cairo
during which he reached out to the Muslim world, openly addressing
American and Muslim relations and offering a hand of friendship, signal-
ing a new direction in American foreign policy. 20 6 Moreover, in February
2010, President Obama nominated an ambassador to Syria, filling a posi-
tion that has been left vacant for five years.20 7 President Obama also cites
the promotion of cultural diplomacy as an important policy goal of his
administration.20 8 Indeed, in a campaign fact sheet Obama explicitly ref-
erenced the success of cultural diplomacy during the Cold War, hoping
that "artists can be utilized again to help [the United States] win the war of
ideas against Islamic extremism. 20 9
diplomacy is on the rise. Perhaps this time we can create enduring structures within
which to practice effective cultural diplomacy.").
202. See AIA Statement, supra note 7.
203. See e.g., Nye, The Decline of America's Soft Power, supra note 22, at 16.
204. See Organizing for America, Foreign Policy, http://www.barackobama.com/
issues/foreign-policy/indexscampaign.php#diplomacy (last visited May 24, 2010).
205. White House, Foreign Policy, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy
(last visited May 24, 2010).
206. See Obama in Egypt Reaches Out to Muslim World, CNN, June 4, 2009, http://
www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/06/04/egypt.obama.speech/index.html/ (last visited
May 24, 2010).
207. See Landler, supra note 30, at A10; see also Robert Burns, Clinton: US Sees Value
in Diplomatic Ties to Syria, AsSOCIATED PREss, April 22, 2010.
208. See Organizing for America, Barack Obama and Joe Biden: Champions for Arts and
Culture, http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/issues/additional/ObamaFactSheetArts.
pdf (last visited May 24, 2010) ("American artists, performers, and thinkers-represent-
ing our values and ideals-can inspire people both at home and all over the world.").
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In Rubin, during oral arguments before the Seventh Circuit, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) filed an amicus curiae brief supporting Iran's
effort to overturn the trial court's disclosure ruling.2 10 During oral argu-
ments a DOJ attorney remarked that "the questions of foreign sovereign
immunity at issue in this case are ones of significant interest to the United
States... [tihey have an impact not just in this case obviously, but in an all
litigation involving foreign states in U.S. courts and also have a ramifica-
tion for the treatment of the U.S. in foreign courts abroad." 21 1 Regardless
of whether the Obama administration's decision to support Iran's appeal
stemmed from concerns over comity or foreign policy, one thing is clear:
the executive branch effectively requested that in the Rubin proceeding, the
applicability of the FSIA's terrorism provisions be waived, echoing Presi-
dent Bush's veto of the initial 2008 amendments, which did not include a
waiver provision for Iraq. 2 12
Conclusion
Politicians and scholars continue to heavily debate the appropriate
response to the threat of global terrorism. 2 13 Generally, advocates of the
FSIA's current scheme advance two major benefits, aside from providing
victims redress, which stem from allowing victims of terrorism to sue state
sponsors. First, because the FSIA provides the potential for substantial
monetary damages, suits brought against state sponsors of terrorism may
deter future support of terrorist organizations, or at the very least, impair
the state's ability to devote resources to the funding of terrorist activity.2 14
Second, proponents argue that the private cause of action created under
the FSIA allows the U.S. government to remain neutral and continue to
participate in diplomatic discourse with sovereigns suspected of terrorist
activity while allowing private citizens to expose those sovereigns before
the international community. 2 15 Both benefits, however, fail to appreciate
an unintended consequence of allowing victims of terrorism to sue state
sponsors-namely, the FSIA's effect on international cultural exchange.
Furthermore, it is disingenuous to suggest that the executive may continue
to effectively engage in diplomacy and "save face" because it is not directly
involved in FSIA suits. Indeed, considering that Congress created the ter-
rorism exception, 2 16  and the judiciary oversees actions brought
thereon,2 17 it is difficult to argue that the U.S. government is not very
much directly involved.
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Other scholars, while not directly endorsing the FSIA's terrorism pro-
visions, have suggested loopholes and ambiguities that can be read into the
statute that may prevent the attachment of cultural objects. 2 18 Such inter-
pretive gambling, however, did not persuade Syria to loan objects to the
Metropolitan for an influential exhibit.2 19 Although the Metropolitan
obtained a grant of immunity from the State Department for the promised
cultural property, both Syria and the Metropolitan decided to avoid any
risk by simply not going forward with Syria's participation. 220 End-run-
ning the statute, moreover, does not answer the underlying foreign policy
issues raised by granting victims of terrorism jurisdiction to bring actions
against foreign sovereigns. 2 2 1 Furthermore, recall that generally the FSIA
is a jurisdiction-stripping statute. 222 The terrorism exception is but one of
the enumerated instances under which states are prevented from raising
the defense of sovereign immunity. 223 Essentially, therefore, those schol-
ars seeking to find a middle-ground between endorsing and opposing the
terrorism provisions would further muddy the FSIA's already complicated
framework by asking courts to read exceptions into exceptions.
Congress passed the FSIA in an attempt to clarify and simplify the
process of granting or denying claims of sovereign immunity by shifting
such determinations from the executive to the judiciary. 22 4 However, by
creating and in 2008 expanding the terrorism provisions, Congress has
effectively usurped an area of control historically reserved for the executive
branch. 225 Indeed, President Obama has not embraced the statutory
framework in place, likely understanding that allowing victims of terrorist
acts to sue foreign sovereigns presents U.S. diplomatic efforts as two-
faced. 226 Naturally, states will question the sincerity of executive rhetoric,
for example, wanting to rebuild ties with Syria, when American courts are
entering multi-million dollar judgments against them in their sovereign
capacity. 2 27
Given the exception's minimal compensatory and deterrent impact,
and substantial diplomatic costs, 2 28 its continued use should be seriously
reassessed. Accordingly, Congress should repeal the FSIA terrorism excep-
218. See Hilton, supra note 13, at 482 (arguing that courts should find that objects on
loan to American museum do not constitute commercial activity thereby shielding them
from possible attachment).
219. See AIA Statement, supra note 7.
220. See id. at 2.
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228. See Taylor, supra note 55, at 534 ("In the years since the terrorism exception was
added to the FSIA, it has accomplished neither compensation nor deterrence. Instead,
suits against state sponsors of terrorism negatively affect U.S. foreign policy and do little
to bring compensation or closure to the victims of terrorism or their families.").
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tion and return to the historic system whereby the executive branch dic-
tated sovereign immunity determinations on a case-by-case basis.2 29
Alternatively, if the current system remains, Congress should create a pro-
vision that delegates authority to the President to waive the terrorism
exception's applicability to any designated state sponsor of terrorism if he
determines that waiver will promote the security and diplomatic interests
of the United States. 230 Perhaps, after meaningfully scrutinizing the cur-
rent statutory system, the political branches may still structure an effective
framework by which victims of terrorism may obtain redress without frus-
trating the goals of cultural diplomacy. Regardless of whether victim com-
pensation is feasible, if the United States hopes to effectively combat the
threat of global terrorism, American foreign policy should focus on coordi-
nating the efforts of private actors, engaging in cultural exchange, and
rebuilding a network of alliances through diplomatic relations.2 3 1
229. This note does not argue for the repeal of the entire FSIA, only those provisions
granting jurisdiction under the terrorism exception. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11.
230. See e.g., Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. 2183, 2189 (2009) (approving such
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